

THE *Dan Smoot Report*



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Formosa

The problem of Formosa is the consequence of fifteen years of diplomacy which, at best, can be called consistent and continuous blundering — at worst, planned treachery against the interests of America.

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China Background

During World War II, China under Chiang Kai-shek was our most valuable ally in the Pacific. Chiang Kai-shek's dogged resistance to Japanese conquest kept millions of Japanese soldiers busy holding Manchuria and other portions of occupied China.

At the various wartime conferences between Roosevelt and Stalin (particularly at Teheran in 1943 and at Yalta in 1945, Roosevelt (ostensibly as the price of getting Stalin to help in the Pacific war) made Stalin promises that involved the sovereignty of China. Chiang Kai-shek knew nothing about these promises, which Roosevelt had no legal or moral right to make. Roosevelt was bartering away rights and territory of one proven ally for promise of help from another ally — whose help was not needed in the Pacific, whose help never came, and whose promises were known to be meaningless anyway.

Throughout this time, communists in China, presumably fighting the Japanese conquerors, were actually in rebellion against Chiang's government, working with the Japs when it suited their aims, laying the groundwork for seizing China from Chiang Kai-shek after the war.

The American offensive broke Japan before the end of 1944. Late in 1944 and early in 1945 (weeks before the Yalta conference in February, 1945) the Japanese were trying to end the Pacific war on surrender terms almost identical with those which MacArthur accepted in August, 1945. If Roosevelt had accepted those Japanese offers, he could have saved hundreds of thousands of Americans (and Japanese, too) who died in the savage fighting which

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occurred during the months *after* the Japs had tried to surrender.

Roosevelt rejected the Japanese overtures, because he wanted to bring the Soviets in to the Pacific war. After Japan collapsed, the Soviets (who had time to equip a great army on the borders of Manchuria) invaded Manchuria. They put communists in control, and gave them, not only the arms taken from Japs caught in Manchuria, but also stores of American military equipment which had been given to the Soviet Siberian armies.

Thus in control of Manchuria and well supplied with material, much of which was American and better than any we had ever given to Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese communists launched an all-out civil war against Chiang.

Communists and pro-communists in the American State Department maneuvered American diplomacy to favor the communists.

Despite the help they were getting from the Soviets and from American pro-communists, however, the Chinese communists soon realized that they had launched their civil war against Chiang too soon: Chiang was winning on all fronts. The Chinese communists needed more help, and the American State Department gave it.

John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore, both widely and notoriously known as pro-communists, conceived the idea of sending General George C. Marshall to China (in late 1945) to stop the fighting between communists and Chiang Kai-shek's government. Vincent and Lattimore actually wrote the memorandum on which Marshall's directive was based.

Marshall's directive was to stop the raging civil war by forcing Chiang Kai-shek to recognize the communists as a legitimate political party and to take them into his government. Chiang had resisted all previous pressures for a coalition government with communists, because he knew them. He knew that when you fight communists, you destroy them or

they destroy you, because cooperation with them is impossible.

But General Marshall was carrying a big stick when he arrived in China in late 1945. He was authorized to terminate all American aid to China if a coalition between Chiang and the communists were not effected; and he was empowered to grant or withhold a new 500 million dollar loan.

Chiang agreed to hold truce talks with the communists who, severely beaten and in bad shape at the time, also agreed; but the communists, instead of trying to come to terms, used the truce talks as a cover period for regrouping and catching their breath to launch a surprise offensive against Chiang's forces.

After several months of this, Chiang was grievously weakened. The communists, who had gained greatly in relative strength, would no longer agree to truce talks of any kind.

Marshall, in the summer of 1946, finally realized that a coalition government could not be formed. He stopped all U. S. military aid to China. He cancelled the 500 million dollar loan and halted shipment of supplies which Chiang had already purchased. We even forbade the shipment to Chiang Kai-shek, from Okinawa and other Pacific islands, of surplus American supplies which had already been promised to Chiang's government. These surplus supplies, withheld from Chiang, were dumped into the Pacific Ocean.

Thus, step by step, we helped to negotiate Chiang Kai-shek off the continent of Asia.

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Korean Background

Chiang Kai-shek remained a serious menace to the communists, even after he had retreated to Formosa.

Occupying Formosa and all the offshore islands between Formosa and the mainland, Chiang practically controlled shipping in the Formosa Strait.

Moreover, the presence of Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa — just ninety miles from the mainland — kept vast numbers of communist

soldiers tied down on the coast, awaiting a dreadfully-feared invasion.

Again, the communists needed help; and again, the American State Department gave it.

Early the next year (1950), Dean Acheson in a press conference at Washington publicly announced that we had written off both Formosa and Korea as places of importance to America.

A few months after this, communists in North Korea invaded South Korea.

The Chinese communists did not at once join this action against South Korea, for one reason: Chiang on Formosa, posing a continual threat of invasion of China.

When Truman made his decision to fight the war in Korea with American troops, while calling it a United Nations police action, both Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and Syngman Rhee in South Korea were appalled. Old Syngman Rhee stood at the docks and wept as he watched the first boatload of American boys land in South Korea. He told the commanding general that America should not send her sons to die in Asia's war. All that Syngman Rhee wanted was material help from America — material help at least comparable to what the communists were getting from the Soviet Union.

Chiang Kai-shek also felt that Asia's war should be fought by Asians. Chiang at the time had the biggest, best-trained fighting force in Asia, and he volunteered to send it to help South Korea.

Truman refused Chiang's offer of troops. He did more than that: he sent the American Seventh Fleet into Chinese waters to neutralize Formosa — to keep Chiang Kai-shek from trying to invade the Chinese mainland, while the war was going on in Korea. Of course, Truman also ordered the Seventh Fleet to keep the communists from invading Formosa; but that was meaningless, because the reds had no navy — not any. Chiang Kai-shek did have a small navy of sorts — the one that got him to Formosa in the first place.

Within a matter of weeks after our Seventh

Fleet moved into the Formosa Strait to protect the communists from Chiang, the communists pulled some 250,000 of their best soldiers out of defensive positions on the China coast and sent them into battle against Americans in Korea.

But note this well: the communists, in sending their armies against ours, were not daring to challenge America's military might. Through their espionage coverage in the United Nations, in the American State Department, and in other western capitals, the communists had been assured that the United Nations would not permit America to strike back at communist China if she intervened in Korea.

Even so, the communists failed to win anything by force of arms in Korea. The senior American military commanders who fought in Korea — Generals MacArthur, Clark, Stratemeyer, Van Fleet, Almond — have testified that we could have won the war in Korea and destroyed communist power in Asia, without precipitating a general war and with fewer casualties than it cost us to lose.

Washington officials would not let our soldiers win, because the United Nations did not want them to win. The communists won, with the same weapon of "negotiation" which they had used against Chiang in China. Time and time again in Korea, when American forces had sustained heavy losses to beat back a communist offensive and have the reds at the point of annihilation, we would halt our boys to have truce talks — just as Marshall had forced Chiang to do in China five years before. Each time, the communists would use the truce talks as a cover for bringing up fresh forces and supplies for a surprise offensive.

Republican politicians in the campaign of 1952 promised to stop this betrayal of America's fighting men and to conclude the Korean war honorably. As it turned out, the Eisenhower Republican's notion of honor was to accept armistice terms dictated by the Chinese communists. The communists have been violating their own armistice terms since the day they were signed.

Formosan Crisis—Number One

The Korean armistice was signed in July, 1953. By mid-1954, the Chinese communists were insulting America with open admissions that they were still holding American prisoners of war, in defiance of the terms of the Korean armistice; and they were defying America to do anything about it. We did nothing except bluster and plead with the United Nations to help us.

By late summer, 1954, the Chinese communists were talking belligerently about taking Formosa, the Pescadores (a group of islands near Formosa) and all the off-shore islands that lie between Formosa and the Chinese mainland. By the winter of 1954, the communists were heavily shelling the offshore islands.

On January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower sent to the Congress a special message requesting authority for the use of armed force, if necessary, to keep the Chinese communists from taking Formosa and the related islands. Congress granted the authority, and there was much rejoicing in America that our government was at long last taking a firm stand against the communists.

But was it?

In making the definite promise to defend Formosa in 1955, we were trying desperately to make a deal with the communists. We put intense pressure on Chiang to evacuate some of the offshore islands (the Tachens group, for example); and we actually helped in the evacuation, to permit the communists to take the island. We were firm in our declaration that we would defend Formosa and the Pescadores islands but remained intentionally vague about the important offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu.

The Eisenhower administration in 1955 was quite willing to let the communists have Quemoy and Matsu and all the other offshore islands; but it would not say so specifically, because it wanted the communists to promise that, if they got the offshore islands, they would leave Formosa and the Pescadores alone

—until the fate of Formosa could be decided by the UN.

The communists would never make such a specific promise; and the Eisenhower administration would never say precisely what it was willing to do about the offshore islands.

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Formosan Crisis—Number Two

The Formosan crisis of 1955, simmered down and disappeared from world notice — with the communists having gained a few offshore islands, but with Chiang still holding the key ones.

In the late summer of 1958, the crisis flared again, when the communists started shelling the offshore islands and threatening to take Formosa.

This has become classical communist behavior. When the reds are ready for more conquest, they start little wars and threaten big ones. All socialists, pro-communists, and neutralists in the United Nations begin to quiver with fright and plead for peaceful negotiations. We proclaim that we are willing to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

At first, the communists loudly reject all overtures. This is merely a part of the act — designed to make us eager, so that when they do consent to negotiate, we will imagine that we have won a victory and will thus be softened to give them what they want. We never yield *all* that they had originally demanded, but we give all that they really wanted or expected. Taking less than their original demands, they claim credit for being reasonable and peace-loving; and we, despite the 41-year-old communist record of breaking all promises, pretend to believe that they will now keep one.

When the communists are ready, they start another round. That's how they have already conquered half of Asia. That's how they plan to conquer the other half, take Formosa, liquidate Chiang Kai-shek, get into the United Nations, and force America to extend them diplomatic recognition.

By the last week of October, 1958, the Formosan crisis had reached exactly the same

stage it had been in three years before when the communists decided to let it subside for a while. The communists were shelling the offshore islands and threatening to take Formosa. The American government was still saying positively that it would help defend Formosa; but our policy with regard to the stepping-stone, off-shore islands was more generally understood by the public in 1958 than in 1955.

In 1958, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were openly eager for Chiang to abandon all the offshore islands, if the communists would promise to leave Formosa and the Pescadores alone. Chiang was flatly refusing. President Eisenhower was saying that he would not force Chiang, but it was obvious to all that the President *wished* Chiang would abandon those troublesome islands.

* * * * *

End of the Formosan Crisis

Settlement of the 1958 Formosan crisis may be announced before this ever goes to press. The crisis may drag for months and subside without settlement, and then flare up again.

But, I predict that, sometime between today and two years from today, we will reach a "settlement" of the Formosan crisis. Our official *wishing* that Chiang would abandon the offshore islands will change to intense pressure on Chiang, and Chiang will have to yield. We will help Chiang evacuate all the offshore islands and then placate him with a huge chunk of military and economic aid for Formosa. The communists will occupy the offshore islands, tacitly (perhaps even formally) promising to leave Formosa alone until its fate can be determined by international agreement — which will mean, of course, the UN deciding to let red China have it, or deciding to demilitarize it and keep it as a UN protectorate.

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What Should We Do About Formosa?

Able military authorities say that Formosa and South Korea are vital to our defenses. This is true if, by *our defenses*, we mean the

defense of Asia. If we are going to continue fighting Asia's wars with American soldiers, we must anticipate that Asia can become a limitless graveyard for our sons. If that is what we are going to do, we should hold on to every base and piece of real estate we have anywhere in the Pacific — and acquire some more.

But why must that be our policy?

Neither the military security nor the economic prosperity of the American nation requires us to defend any part of Asia. Indeed, bankruptcy and death await us if we do not disengage ourselves from the political and military affairs of the rest of the world and look to our own national defense.

Moreover, as a constitutional republic of free men, America has no right to send her soldiers to die in the wars of foreign rulers.

Surely, old Syngman Rhee was right in saying that Asians should fight Asia's wars.

But what can we do about Formosa and South Korea? We should never have become involved there as we are; but we are involved; and we cannot just turn and walk away, as we could in other parts of the world, because our involvement there is different: it has been sealed by the blood of 50,000 Americans who died in Korea, by the suffering of American soldiers held and tortured to death as political hostages in red China, and by the demands of national honor.

There is excellent reason to believe that communism would not be the dominant power in Asia — that Chiang would not be an exiled fugitive on Formosa and that Rhee would not be sitting under the menacing communist guns of North Korea and red China — if it had not been for the pro-communist policies which the American State Department has followed since Roosevelt's first wartime conference with Stalin.

Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek still claim that if they were adequately supplied with material and turned loose, they could break the communist hold on China. Their contention was obviously sound, before the

Korean war built red China into a significant military power. It may be that we have let the hour pass when Asian anti-communists can wrest control of their homelands from communism.

Does it make sense for us to sit forever, supporting South Korea and Formosa as American wards, while engaging to guarantee that they will not be permitted to fight the enemy we are protecting them against?

Ultimately, inevitably, total war or total surrender will be the outcome of such a policy.

What then?

Why not take Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek at their word, before we *know* it is too late? The Chinese communists have murdered millions of Chinese and brutalized millions more. They are bound to have legions of bitter enemies inside China. If well-fed and well-equipped Asiatic armies from Formosa and South Korea started simultaneous invasions of the Chinese mainland, widespread rebellion and wholesale desertions from the communist ranks might break out all over China.

If we would gather together the vast military stores and civilian supplies which we are now scattering all over the earth, some to communist countries, and the rest to nations which will never use them to fight communism, and divert those supplies to Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee, we might start a rapid disintegration of communist power in Asia.

What if this didn't happen? What if the communists destroyed Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee? What if these two refused to fight?

There is one thing we can be sure of: America cannot fight Asia's wars for her. If there are not enough Asians willing and able to fight for their own freedom, with us giving the wherewithal to fight, then Asia cannot be saved. We had better find that out right now, before we blunder into another war that our sons will have to fight.

Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek are the only Christian heads of government in all of

Asia; the only two who really want to fight communism. If we keep appeasing and negotiating with the communists, and delaying the inevitable showdown, we will negotiate Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek out of existence. When they go, the hope of freedom from communist slavery in Asia goes with them.

Wouldn't our friends and enemies all over the world accuse us of starting a war in Asia? Of course, they would; but aren't they doing it now? For 13 years our government has been crushing us with taxes for foreign aid — to provide the rest of the world with the means of fighting communism.

The two remaining anti-communist governments in Asia say they want to fight. Why not let them? Or, is our entire post-war program of "strengthening the free world to resist communism" a frightful lie, intended only to hobble and destroy America?

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Party Versus Country

Congressman Bruce Alger (Republican, Fifth Congressional District of Texas) is bidding for a third term in Congress.

Sam Rayburn, powerful speaker of the House, has bluntly said that he "will not permit" Alger to be re-elected to Congress. The Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO have characterized Bruce Alger as the worst congressman in Washington. Paul Butler, national Chairman of the Democratic Party has said that Alger must be defeated.

To Americans who understand and respect American constitutional principles, all of this sets Bruce Alger apart — as among the *best* Congressmen in Washington.

How did Bruce Alger win such distinction in four years? By the simple device of being guided by conscience and constitutional principles rather than by party or political expediency.

This indicates that conscience and constitutional principles are rare in American politics. The fate of Bruce Alger's present campaign for reelection will rather classically demonstrate whether American voters really want

conscience and principles in Washington.

Bruce Alger was one of two U. S. Congressmen who voted against extension of Social Security in the 1958 election year. He was the *only* U. S. Congressman in 1958 who had the courage to vote against the program of using federal money to provide free milk for school lunch rooms. He was simply using the yardstick with which he measures every legislative problem: Is it constitutional? Is it good for the country? Can we afford it?

Bruce Alger's current opponent (Barefoot Sanders, Democrat) is the direct opposite philosophically. Sanders had a term in the Texas State Legislature and proved himself to be a thorough-going, left-wing new dealer. He calls himself a conservative and a moderate and characterizes Bruce Alger as a reactionary. Yet, Sanders supports every left-wing program that is bad for America, from urban renewal to foreign aid; and he has the support of the unions and all other organizations like them.

Consequently, the Congressional election in Dallas on November 4, 1958, will be one of the very few in which voters will have a clear-cut choice between a constitutionalist and a socialist-laborite.

Wouldn't you expect every conservative in conservative Dallas to support Bruce Alger? Most of them are; and I predict that Bruce will

win; but it will be a close race, very close, because the big money in Dallas is not behind Bruce Alger: it is behind Barefoot Sanders.

One of the two "conservative" papers in Dallas (*The Daily Times Herald*) is supporting Barefoot Sanders; the unions, of course, are all for him; and so is a group of Dallas' wealthiest, most prominent businessmen—men like Stanley Marcus, President of Nieman-Marcus.

Why?

Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson have passed the word down that they are tired of Dallas businessmen coming to Washington and asking Sam and Lyndon for federal handouts, because Dallas doesn't have a Congressman who will get handouts for his own constituents. Sam and Lyndon are going to cut the big Dallas businessmen off from their entrée to the public funds, if they don't elect a Congressman who will go along with Sam and Lyndon.

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Politics—General

Generally, the political situation in 1958 is a dismal picture to American constitutionalists. At the recent southern governor's conference, these men who — above all other politicians in America — should be trying to find an American constitutionalist to run for the presidency in 1960, devoted most of their pub-

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CITY AND STATE

lic statements to praising the extreme left-wing, union-controlled Senator, John Kennedy of Massachusetts. Instead of trying to form a party that would represent American constitutionalists, southern politicians are now arguing with Paul Butler about who owns the Democrat Party (when all the world knows that Walter Reuther owns it).

The same low level of political leadership is apparent in every other part of the nation. In California, conservatives are backing Knowland for governor, because Knowland's campaign is tied to the badly needed Right-to-Work proposition, and because Knowland does talk like a conservative, whereas his opponent, Edmund Brown, is an outspoken new-deal Democrat. But well-informed California conservatives who have watched Knowland have no enthusiasm for him. They have spent too many years listening to Knowland deliver conservative speeches while making an almost-perfect modern-republican voting record in the Senate.

Here and there throughout the nation, however, there are political currents which could do some good. In California, the little Constitution Party (state headquarters at 670 Geary Street, San Francisco 2, California) is running a full slate of write-in candidates, headed by Jessie M. Ritchie, a nationally-known chemical manufacturer in Oakland, candidate for

U. S. Senate; and Louis A. Delaney, independent oil operator of Long Beach, candidate for governor. If any one of the Constitution Party candidates gets a 3% write-in vote in November, the party will qualify for a place on the ballot in 1960. California conservatives may be ready for a genuine conservative party in 1960, but they must prepare for it this year.

In Utah, Bracken Lee stands a good chance of going to the U. S. Senate as an independent. Barry Goldwater in Arizona (though running for reelection to the Senate as a Republican) has, like Bruce Alger, shown himself independent of party control.

There are other similar situations around the country. The straws-in-the-wind may seem few and slim and totally unrelated; but to me, they indicate hope. If well-informed political conservatives throughout America will do the best they can in 1958, however little that may seem, they may prepare the ground for a genuine political uprising of American constitutionalists in 1960.

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF THE DAN SMOOT REPORT, published weekly, at Dallas, Texas, for October 1, 1958.

The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Dan Smoot, Dallas, Texas; Editor, Dan Smoot; Managing editor, none; Business Manager, Mabeth E. Smoot, Dallas, Texas.

The owner is: Dan Smoot

There are no bondholders, mortgagees, or other security holders.

The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: 7,000.

Signed by Mabeth E. Smoot, Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 17th day of October, 1958, Philip Craven, Notary Public, County of Dallas, Texas. Commission expires June 1, 1959.

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Dan Smoot was born in Missouri. Reared in Texas, he attended SMU in Dallas, taking BA and MA degrees from that university in 1938 and 1940.

In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow in English, doing graduate work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of American Civilization.

In 1942, he took leave of absence from Harvard in order to join the FBI. At the close of the war, he stayed in the FBI, rather than return to Harvard.

He served as an FBI Agent in all parts of the nation, handling all kinds of assignments. But for three and a half years, he worked exclusively on communist investigations in the industrial midwest. For two years following that, he was on FBI headquarters staff in Washington, as an Administrative Assistant to J. Edgar Hoover.

After nine and a half years in the FBI, Smoot resigned to help start the Facts Forum movement in Dallas. As the radio and television commentator for Facts Forum, Smoot, for almost four years spoke to a national audience giving both sides of great controversial issues.

In July, 1955, he resigned and started his own independent program, in order to give only one side — the side that uses fundamental American principles as a yardstick for measuring all important issues.

If you believe that Dan Smoot is providing effective tools for those who want to think and talk and write on the side of freedom, you can help immensely by subscribing, and encouraging others to subscribe, to *The Dan Smoot Report*.

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